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THE HOUSING CRISIS IN A FREE ECONOMY
ROBINSON NEwcolm* AND H. C. KYLt
"Crisis" is defined by one of the standard dictionaries as "a turning point in the
progress of an affair or series of events" One may reasonably claim to be com-
pletely justified in considering the progress of housing to be both quite an "affair"
and a real "series of events."
In this discussion, the writers are avoiding detailed analyses of such important sub-
jects as housing needs, public housing, or the extent of submarginal housing. This
study can therefore be confined to aspects of how the private economy operates in
the housing field. We can watch how housing moves, from one turning point to
the next, and possibly prescribe for the reduction of such turning points. The writers
make no claim to the key to "solve" the housing problem.
The first thing anyone notices who looks at the data is the seriousness of the
recurring crises in housing which seem to come as inevitably as taxes, death or win-
ter. The fluctuations in the construction cycle are greater than those for the economy
as a whole, or even for industrial production. The fluctuations are comparable to
those in the production of capital goods, and are far greater than can be found for the
production of any important non-durable commodity with a comparable wide market.
(See Charts i and 2 and Tables i and 2 on next two pages.)
This is a qualitative rather than a quantitative statement, for we do not have
good data on the volume of house building. Bureau of Labor Statistics data are
based on building permits, which are largely an urban phenomenon, and do not
necessarily reflect the volume of new units being provided outside city limits, or
inside cities through conversion of existing facilities. Consequently, the Bureau's
data may drop much more in poor years and rise more in active years than the
volume of house building itself.
Some unpublished data from the War Production Board files may be used to
illustrate this. It was necessary to know during the war how much material would
actually disappear from the market, as contrasted with what should disappear if
rules and official figures were completely followed. As an aid in estimating what
would actually happen in contrast to what would be reported, a study was made of
the number of units provided from 1930 to 1940, including units made available
through alterations and through construction in rural non-farm areas. The data
developed were compared with building permit data on the number of residential
units added in the same period as officially reported by the Department of Labor,
*A.B., M.A., 1924, Oberlin College; Ph.D., 1928, Brookings Graduate School of Economics and Gov-
eminent. Director of Office of Economic Research, Federal Works Agency.
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CHART I. INDEXES OF NON-FARM HOUSING CONSTRUCTION AND PRODUCTION OF
SELECTED DURABLE GOODS
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Source: Housing Data, Ig2o-29 from Dept. of Commerce.
(unofficial data).
Other Data, From Federal Reserve Board Indexes.
1930-39 from War Production Board
TABLE I. INDEXES OF NON-FARM HOUSING CONSTRUCTION AND PRODUCTION OF SELECrED
DURABLE GOODS.
1935-1939 100
Year Housing* Iron and Steelt Machineryt
1920 .................. 53 ...
1921 .................. 62 ...
1922 .................. 60
1923 .................. ..... 94 i98
1924 .................. 130 90 81
1925 .................. 140 108 89
1926 .................. 145 115 102
1927 .................. 148 108 99
1929 .................. 136 121 106
1929 .................. 119, 133 130
1930 .................. 80 97 100
1931 .................. 68 61 66
1932 .................. 55 32 43
1933 .................. 62 54 50
1934 .................. 57 61 69
1935 .................. 80 81 83
1936 ................... 102 114 105
1937 .................. 115 123 126
1938 .................. 95 68 82
1939 ................... 108 114 104
with the results shown in the following table (Table 3). Better data are available
now than were available at the time the study was made, so the WPB estimates, if
they were to be made now, would be somewhat different from the estimates made
about five years ago. However, the difference probably would not be significant.
This table suggests that while the fluctuations in the number of units added may
not be as great as appears from official statistics, they are still far greater than a free
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CHART 2. INDEXES OF NoN-FARM HOUSING CONSTRUCTION AND PRODUCTION OF
SELECTED NoN-DURABLE GOODS
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TABLE 2. INDEXES OF NON-FARM HOUSING CONSTRUCTION AND PRODUCTION OF SELECTED
NoN-DURABLE GOODS.
Manufactured Food
Year Housing* Textilest Productst
1920 .................. 53....
1921 .................. 62...
1922 .................. 60
1923 .................. 94
1924 .................. 130 72 81
1925 .................. 140 84 85
1926 .................. 145 84 87
1927 .................. 148 92 88
1928 .................. 136 87 93
1929 .................. 119 94 101
1930 .................. 80 74 100
1931 .................. 68 79 90
1932 .................. 55 71 79
1933 .................. 62 88 83
1934 .................. ".57 76 88
1935 .................. 80 93 89
1936 .................. 102 104 98
1937 .................. 115 106 103
1938 .................. 95 85 101
1939 .................. 108 112 108
* 1920-1929 data from Dept. of Commerce, 1930-1939 data from War Production Board,
t From Federal Reserve Board Indexes.
TABLE 3. NUMBER OF NoN-FARM RESIDENTIAL UNrS ADDED BY YERs.
Official Unofficial Official Unofficial
BLS WPB BLS WPB
Reports Estimates Reports Estimates
1930 ............... 330 464 1935 ............... 221 457
1931 ............... 254 391 1936 ............... 319 586
1932 ............... 134 314 1937 ................ 336 658
1933 ............... 93 354 1938-............... 406 546
1934 ............... 126 325 1939 ............... 515 617
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economy can stand with any comfort. The WPB figures suggest that the number
of new housing units supplied at the depth of the depression was only about a third
of the 937,ooo estimated by the BLS, and of the 832,ooo estimated by the Department
of Commerce to have been supplied at the high point in the curve.
There are many factors entering into this feast and famine aspect of the house
construction market. Some of these factors are common to the production of all
durable goods or capital goods, though there are aspects of even these factors which
are peculiar to the housing field. Other factors are unique to the housing field
itself. A mental review of what happens during the housing cycle may suggest some
of the factors that are inherent in the normal free market relationships in this field
and suggest how difficult it has been to do more than talk about stabilizing the
industry.
Suppose we start our review at the bottom of the construction cycle in a small
community which begins to come out of a depression with a surplus of ioo houses
in terms of its capacity to support housing, and with a growth of the number of
families in the community which averages about 35 a year. Under such circum-
stances while there might be a housing shortage in terms of social need, there would
be no shortage in terms of commercial markets for more than three years, because
it would take longer than that for the normal rate of growth in the number of fam-
ilies to be reached. There would be building of course, even at the bottom of the
depression, for even then some families would want a particular type of house in a
certain block and be able to pay for what they want. But there would be no sizable
volume of building. However, as the community got on its feet family formation
would increase and soon there would be undoubling of existing families. Undoubling
for a time might add 15 a year to the effective demand for housing. Within a few
years the industry would wake up to the fact that there were few vacancies and
that there was a potential increase in the number of families of 50 a year, or 35
through normal growth, plus 15 through undoubling. Industry might build five
houses, or even io, the first year, maybe 20 the second year after the bottom of the
depression, 35 the third year, and 50 the fourth year without increasing vacancies.
It could continue to build at the rate of 50 a year for another two or three years
without increasing the number of vacancies. But after undoubling began to decline
and new family formation dropped to 35, vacancies would begin to appear if the
industry were to continue at the rate of 5o houses a year.
A small vacancy, possibly one of 5 per cent, would be desirable and would not
cause any worry. A slight increase in the number of vacancies and increasing diffi-
culty in disposing of houses might result in a slight decrease in the number of houses
built and better value for those buying them, but sooner or later industry would
have to drop to an average of 35. But it would not do this in time.
Vacancies do not appear until after houses have been built and until the industry
has been geared to a rate greater than the market can absorb at the prices charged.
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Prices do not fall rapidly enough to maintain the demand, and owners of existing
properties may begin to offer concessions in price before the construction industry
cuts its prices. This encourages the use of existing properties rather than new ones,
or it will at least tend to discourage new construction. If a general decline in in-
come or employment occurs at this time, doubling-up begins again. The volume
of new family formation might drop to 2o, in place of the previous figure of 50.
For a short time family formation might drop even below this, and if the industry
continued to produce even at a rate of 2o or 30 houses a year surpluses could increase
and construction might almost stop. The cycle would then start over again and it
might be several years after general business picked up before the volume of hous-
ing construction would again equal the average increase in the number of families.
To state it more briefly, industry adjusts itself to a volume which will take care
of a shortage plus normal growth, keeps on building at this rate after the shortage
disappears, finds a surplus on its hands, shuts down until another shortage develops,
and then starts the next turn on the merry-go-round.
This sharp fluctuation could be reduced if the industry could adjust its prices to
changes in family income. If, as family incomes drop the price of new housing
could also drop, sales would not vary as they do. There are many reasons why this
has not happened. One of the reasons that the construction industry finds it hard
to adjust its prices to changes in demand is the handicraft nature of its site assembly
methods. As production increases on a belt line operation, unit costs tend to drop.
As production increases in a handicraft operation of a conventional nature, unit
costs do not necessarily tend to drop. After a time less skilled workers must be
employed, or overtime resorted to. Manhours per unit of output will then tend to
go up. Because sizable commitments for building materials usually are not male
for a long period in advance in the housing field, as is the case in more important
manufacturing industries, prices for material and equipment also may go up as
volume increases. So we have the phenomenon of an industry pricing itself out of
a market as sales increase.
On the other hand, when the market is obviously shrinking, and unemployment
in the house building industry becomes serious, costs do not drop rapidly. The
prices of some building materials actually were higher in x933 than in 1929. This
failure of the price of building materials to follow changes in the size of the market
is due in part to the fact that the price of no one material has much effect on the price
of a finished house. If the producers of one material reduce prices, producers of
other materials, and labor, will get more benefit from the reduction in price than
will the companies reducing their prices.
Labor, too, can resist price reductions in a declining market for a while. It may
be easier to slow down on a handicraft operation than it is in a manufacturing
operation in which speed is controlled by the machine or the belt. It is a natural
trait hallowed by long practice to spread the work as employment opportunities de-
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crease, and so some costs rise as volume decreases-just as others rose as volume
increased.
Nor is there a strong immediate incentive to reduce prices due to competition
with the existing supply of housing, such as there may be in the field of manfac-
tured consumer goods when production exceeds sales. The more durable and less
affected by style changes a given commodity may be, the greater is the temptation to
hold prices up in the hopes of selling it at the price originally planned. If goods are
likely to spoil or lose their style value there may be more incentive to reducing
prices of existing stocks, thereby forcing those that are manufacturing new stocks to
reduce prices to compete. The construction industry is not subject to this type of
rapid pressure and may not be compelled to reduce its prices or costs to any major
degree till long after a decline sets in. By the time it has gotten around to reducing
prices, its home building volume will have been seriously reduced.
This historical tendency to shift from overproduction to underproduction is re-
inforced by the fact that industry has tended to concentrate on the upper income
group. There are not as many families in the upper income groups as in the middle
and lower income groups, so the oversupply of houses (in terms of capacity to pay,
not in terms of need) must be absorbed by families whose income is lower than the
income of the families for whom houses were designed. This means a sizable de-
preciation in value must take place. That does not happen rapidly so the industry
must mark time while the oversupply of housing for the upper income brackets
finds it way down to the mass markets. The famine period for the industry, which
would be long enough if it had overbuilt in each income range, is extended because
it has concentrated its overbuilding in the upper income ranges. The dull period
for the industry may therefore be a long one.
These factors which tend to make for violent fluctuations have their influence
reinforced by the long life of the average house. There are, roughly, 32 million
non-farm housing units in the country. If we add i,2ooooo a year to that number,
we are adding almost 4 per cent, because very few of the 32 million will disappear
from the market in a given year. If the average life were 20 or 25 years, almost
4 per cent of the houses might disappear in a given year so that 1,20o,ooo new houses
would be needed just to maintain the supply. Fluctuations in the rate of family
formation would then affect demand over and above this replacement market.
Effective demand therefore might vary from 1.2 million per year to 2 million per
year, rather than from 300,000 to possibly i,2ooooo per year.
Other influences strengthening these tendencies are discussed elsewhere in this
symposium, so the point will not be elaborated further here.
The same factors which have made for great variations in the demand for new
housing in the past may continue to do so in the immediate future. For instance,
the Census estimates that the increase in the number of families during each half
of 1947 will be about 525,0o0, but that in the last six months of 1949, only two years
later, the increase will be only about 175,0oo. That is a drop of two thirds. A slight
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recession in income, or changes in other factors could cause very appreciable changes
from the Census figures and therefore could accentuate the tendency for the private
house building industry to continue to fluctuate wildly in the future. Unless there
is a significant change in the policies of the private house building industry, activity
may continue to move from one turning point in an affair to another, from one
crisis to the next.
Despite the almost fatalistic appearance of the forces causing the sharp cycles in
the industry, and the holding down of housing standards for the lower rent families,
there appears to be good reason to believe that the construction industry can change
its policies. Not all the influences causing trouble are entirely beyond the control of
the industry. Decisions to build at price levels which match incomes, and to reduce
costs, particularly as volume rises, for instance, are decisions which would affect the
volume and stability of house building and which within limits are subject to con-
scious control by the industry itself. If these and other difficulties are vigorously
attacked, housing markets could be very decidedly increased, housing standards
raised and fluctuations in construction reduced toward the order of magnitude of
those in the consumer goods market.
While the first things that attract attention when one looks at the data on the
private house building industry are the extreme fluctuation in its rate of activity
and the fact that it always misjudges its effective market both in volume and in
price range, it should be pointed out in fairness to the industry that we have a
higher standard of housing than almost any other country, and that we have steadily
improved our standards. Even today, following the nearest approach to an all-out
war that this country has experienced, we have a higher. standard of housing than
we had in x94o.
Much of our housing is pobr, not in relation to what we have had in the past,
and not in relation to what most countries have, but in relation to the technical
capacity of the country to provide shelter. However, if the industry could operate
at capacity and produce the housing it knows how to produce, at a profit for each
income level, our housing standards would be further improved. Private industry
has shown a technical capacity to improve housing standards. Better manage-
ment and planning can result in private industry raising our housing standards
nearer to what its technical resources would permit. To the extent that the housing
industry fails to utilize its managerial abilities in this direction other approaches will
be needed.
The following table (Table 4) illustrates how our housing standards have been
raised even during the five years of war and preparation for war.
This table shows that even during the war we were able to provide better heat-
ing, plumbing, and other facilities for our families than we had provided before.
There is therefore good reason to believe that private industry can do much in a free
economy to improve both housing standards, and the stability of the industry.
We were able to do this during the war in large part because of a sharp increase
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TABLE 4. OCCUPIED DWELLING UNITS, BY STATE OF REPAIR AND PLUMBING EQUIPMENT,
FOR THE UNITED STATES, URBAN AND RURAL NON-FARM: 1945 AND 1940.*
(In thousands of units)
Estimated IncreaseNumber 1940 to 1945f Per cent
State of Repair and Plumbing Equipment 1945 19 r Pe 
cet 194 1940
1945 1940 Number Per cent 1945 1940
Total Occupied Dwelling Units .......... 31,281 27,748 3,533 12.7 100.0 100.0
With private bath and private flush toilet.. 23,378 18,653 4,725 25.3 74.7 67.2
With private flush toilet, no private bath... 1,474 1,450 24 1.7 4.7 5.2
With running water, no private flush toilet.. 2,917 3,134 - 217 - 6.9 9.4 11.3
No running water in dwelling unit ......... 3,512 4,511 - 999 -22.1 11.2 16.3
Dwelling units not needing major repairs. 28,318 23,830 4,488 18.8 90.5 85.9
With private bath and private flush toilet.. 22,464 17,340 5,124 29.6 71.8 62.5
With private flush toilet, no private bath.. 1,163 1,120 43 3.8 3.7 4.0
With running water, no private flush toilet. 2,337 2,435 - 98 - 4.0 7.5 8.8
No running water in dwelling unit ......... 2,354 2,935 - 581 -19.8 7.5 10.6
Dwelling units needing major repairs . 2,963 3,918 - 955 -24.4 9.5 14.1
With private bath and private flush toilet. 914 1,313 - 399 -30.4 2.9 4.7
With private flush toilet, no private bath... 311 330 - 19 - 5.8 1.0 1.2
With running water,.no private flush toilet.. 580 699 - 119 -17.0 1.9 2.5
No running water in dwelling unit ....... 1,158 1,576 - 418 -26.5 3.7 5.7
*Source: Bureau of the Census, Series 11-46, No. I.
t A minus sign (-) denotes decrease.
in family incomes in relation to housing costs. Families could afford better housing
in 1945 than they could afford in 1940. The current housing shortage is caused
principally by an increase in income and not by a failure in the supply of housing
to keep pace with the normal increase in the number of families. It is caused by an
increase in demand in excess of the normal growth in the number of families.
The Census study from which the table above is extracted indicates that there
was an increase of 2,745,000 by November, 1945, over the figure for April, 1940, in
the total number of occupied units, and an increase of 3,533,000 in occupied non-
farm units for the same period. The latter figure represents an annual growth of
about 65o,ooo in the number of families. The average annual increase in the num-
ber of non-farm families is not expected to be much over 65o,ooo in the 40's, or much
over 400,000 in the 5o's. The country therefore provided as much housing as it
needs on an average to take care of the increase in the number of families; moreover,
housing of higher standards was occupied at the end of the war than at the begin-
ning. (This is not to imply that more and better housing was not needed during
the war.) From the standpoint of long time average effective demand, the industry
did all that was required, and about all the WPB controls would permit. But the
industry did not provide housing to meet the effective demand caused by the
change in family income.
This wartime experience is a clue to one of the reasons why private industry can
go still farther toward raising housing standards, increasing volume and reducing
fluctuations. During the war national income rose, but controls on industry and on
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CHART 3. 1945 To 1960 CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS FOR NoN-FARM DWELLING UNITS
AT i960 PRICES BY RENT CLASSES UNDER ASSuMPTIoNS OF THIS STUDY
T WW IEUFI110=I"~
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Rent-Dollars P&" Month
TABLE 5. DEMAND FOR NoN-FARM DWELLING UNITS BY 1960 AT 1960 PRICES.
(All estimates in thousands)
Number of 1945 Estimated Portion of
Dwelling Units Demand for 1960 Demand
Rent Class Available in Dwelling Units Satisfied by Shortages Surplus$ Per Month 1960 1960 1945 Supply
0-10 .... 4,228 1,931 1,931 ..... 2,297
10-20 .... 6,559 3,926 3,926 ..... 2,633
20-30 .... 6,707 5,367 5,367 1,340
30-40 .... 5,515 6,245 5,515 '730
40-50 .... 3,852 6,045 3,852 2,193
50-60 .... 1,772 5,355 1,772 3,583 .....
60-70 .... 1,261 4,183 1,261 2,922 .....
70-80 .... 646 2,620 646 1,974 .....
80-90 .... 441 1,511 441 1,070 .....
90-100 .... 239 805 239 566 .....
100-120 .... 406 1,025 406 619 .....
120-140 .... 240 712 240 472 .....
140-170 .... 215 663 215 448 .....
170-200 .... 108 300 108 192 .....
Over 200 .... 65 128 65 63 .....
TOTALS ...... 32,254 40,816 25,984 14,832 6,270
prices kept construction costs down. Consequently, the purchasing power for hous-
ing was increased. If in the post-war period industry can itself hold prices down,
this improved relationship of income to housing costs can be maintained. To the
extent that this improved relationship is maintained, housing markets will go up.
A quick look at the figures in Table 5 (accompanying Chart 3) relating to the num-
ber of housing units demanded in each rental range will indicate why the hiarket will
I P-"
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be so much bigger if there is only a slight improvement in the relation of construc-
tion costs to income. There are far more people who can afford to pay $6o a month
for their housing than can pay $70, and more who can afford to pay $5° than $6o,
and so on down the line. If construction costs stay down, so that in terms of constant
prices families who previously could pay only $5o can now afford to pay the equiv-
alent of $65, these families will not find enough $65 houses. Consequently, even if
every existing $65 house were vacated, and families living in $50 units were to move
to these houses, there would still be a demand for new $65 houses. That in brief is
why it is so important for the construction industry to hold its costs to an increase
roughly 40 per cent over the 1940 levels in order that a margin may be kept be-
tween the new construction costs and the new incomes. It enables the industry to
find a market in rehousing existing families in addition to the market created by
the increase in the total number of families.
If the industry will hold its increase in prices and costs to a level sizably below
the increase in family incomes, for the first time in history it will be going after a
replacement market as well as the market created by the increase in the number of
families. If, in addition, it distributes its new housing in price ranges commensurate
with the demand instead of building for the upper income families, it will increase
its replacement market immediately and sharply. Instead of having to adjust itself
to a fluctuating increase in the number of families which in the near future may
level off at about 400,oo a year, it may be able to adjust itself to a market averaging
around a million a year. The steps necessary for this readjustment and shift to a
more profitable basis are steps which the industry can take. They do 'not present
insurmountable obstacles.
The major step that must be taken to achieve this objective of stability, increased
markets and higher housing standards, is that of holding down construction costs.
If they can be held within i4o per cent of .the 1940 levels and family incomes main-
tained at the 1945 levels, the market will be approximately double what it would be
if construction costs rise as much as income. Costs now are much higher than i4o
per cent of 194o because production of materials is much below capacity, and pre-
war efficiency and post-war possibilities have not been achieved in the manufacturing
of building materials. Construction costs are high also because of uncertain deliv-
eries, uncertain prices and temporarily lower labor efficiency at the site, which makes
it impossible to build at costs which should be reached in the near future. It is
encouraging that men with competence in the field believe that construction costs
can be held to levels not far from 4o-per cent above those prevailing in 1940.
The second step that must be taken is to build to the market, that is to the in-
come distribution of the families able to rent or buy housing units. If the industry
continues to build for the upper income group, it will have to wait long periods for
property to depreciate, between spells of activity. If it will build directly for the
huge market created by the increase in family incomes, it will not have to wait for
property to depreciate and will not have to limit itself to the increase in the number
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of families. There are many other minor and some relatively important steps which
should be taken, but these two are essential. If these are taken, many other steps
will follow more or less automatically.
The problems of holding down building costs are somewhat the same the country
over. The problems of calculating the market to which to build will differ from
city to city. We may illustrate the demand that will be created by thes6 two steps
by making some rough calculations for the country as a whole rather than for any
one city. This will illustrate how the market, housing standards and stability could
be increased in any area in which the industry were to build to the demand in each
group.
The basic data needed for the house building industry to develop a program for
volume and pricing which would make a huge market profitable and relative stabil-
ity possible are available to the industry. We know a great deal about the family
formation. We know an increasing amount about the income and rental distribution
which controls the housing market. By projecting these facts we can determine
within relative workable margins of error the markets for housing. The following
tables indicate two sets of premises which may be used by the industry in calculating
its markets. Our first assumption in the first set of premises (designated herein in
text, charts and tables as the Basic Assumption or Assumption A) is that construc-
tion, rents and values will level off about 40 per cent above the 194o base. This may
be too high or too low, but for our purpose it appears to be a satisfactory figure.
We assumed that the Census estimates for the number of families in 196o are approxi-
mately correct, that approximately 6,ooo,ooo of the families in 196o will be farm fam-
ilies, so that the total number of non-farm families (to which this discussion is
limited) will be about 38,775,ooo. We used depreciation rates for the housing exist-
ing in 1945 that depended on the 1945 values. The rates we used are shown in the
following table (Table 6). Next we assume that the per capita family income after
taxes in 196o will be approximately equivalent to that in 1945. This may mean a
slight reduction in real income after taxes because the cost of living may be higher
in x96o than it was in 1945. There are reasons why this assumption may be too
optimistic and why it may be too pessimistic. For instance, the income of indi-
viduals is already higher than it was in 1945. Members of the armed forces should
be getting more in 196o as civilian workers than they were getting in 1945 working
for the Army or the Navy. On the other hand, unemployment may be lower now
than we may expect for the long pull. And there may be fewer women, old, and
very young workers employed per family by 196o than there were in i945. But if
any allowance is to be made for increased productivity during the next 15 years, it
would seem that the family incomes of 196o might at least approximate the levels
of 1945.
It was assumed finally, in the first set of premises, that the proportion of non-
farm disposable income available for rent or rental equivalent will be about 15.3 per
cent as compared with 1;.8 per cent in 1939, and 17.8 per cent in 1929. This is based
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TABLE 6. 1945 NON-FARM HOUSEHOLDS.
(1940 and i96o prices)
Fireland 1945 Homes
Depreci- Total Demolition Available
Rent 1945 Homes ation Depreci- Net Price 1945 Homes Losses in 1960 -
Class 1940 Prices (Per cent ation Change* 1960 Prices 1945 - 1960 1960 Prices$ Per Mo. (000) per year) (Per cent) (Per cent) (000) (000) (000)
0-10 4,372 2.66 40.0 0. 4,372 144 4,228
10-20 7,326 2.33 35.0 5.0 6,649 90 6,559
20-30 7,863 2.10 31.5 8.5 6,770 63 6,707
30-40 6,211 1.80 27.0 13.0 5,560 45 5,515
40-50 3,029 1.80 27.0 13.0 3,892 40 3,852
50-60 1,510 1.60 24.0 16.0 1,799 27 1,772
60-70 817 1.60 24.0 16.0 1,275 14 1,261
70-80 468 1.50 22.5 17.5 654 8 646
80-90 298 1.33 20.0 20.0 445 4 441
90-100 202 1.33 20.0 20.0 242 3 239
100-110 166 1.20 18.0 22.0 229 3 226
110-120 124 1.20 18.0 22.0 183 3 180
120 -130 96 1.15 17.3 22.7 131 2 129
130-140 62 1.15 17.3 22.7 113 2 111
140-150 46 1.15 17.3 22.7 99 1 98
150. 160 37 1.10 16.5 23.5 65 1 64
160-170 28 1.10 16.5 23.5 53 t 53
170-180 20 1.00 15.0 25.0 41 t 41
180-190 14 1.00 15.0 25.0 38 t 38
190-200 8 1.00 15.0 25.0 29 t 29
200 & over 7 1.00 15.0 25.0 65 t 65
TOTALS... 32,704 .... .... .... 32,704 450 32,254
A 40% incretase in the price level from 1940 to 1960 was assumed (the Basic Assumption in text above).
tLes than thoutand.
on the belief that there will be a long-time downward trend in the ratio of the hous-
ing expenditures to income, but that the decline from 1929 to 1939 was much greater
than the long-time average. The depression of the 3o's reduced expenditures for
housing, and incomes started to rise toward the end of the period. A smaller pro-
portion of the disposable income therefore went for rent or rental equivalent in
1939 than would have been required had there been io prosperous years during the
30's. The use of the 15.3 per cent figure is about the equivalent of suggesting a
decline of one third in the proportion of the income going to rent over a period of a
century. The following charts and accompanying tables show the operation of this
Basic Assumption.
As can be seen from these charts and accompanying tables, variations from these
assumptions were also developed. One of these was that there would be an increase
in construction costs and rent and rental equivalent of 50 per cent'above the i94o
base. Another one was an increase of 30 per cent in these three items. Still another
change in the assumptions was for a variation of 5 per cent in the proportion of
income going to rent above and below the 15.3 per cent used.
A somewhat different assumption was set forth by Mr. Wyatt (referred to in the
charts and tables as Assumption B) in his testimony before the House Banking and
Currency Committee. The data presented in this testimony suggest Mr. Wyatt
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CHART 4. EFFECT oF VARYING THE ESTIMATED PROPORTION oF NoN-FARM DisPosABL
INcomE GOING TO RENT IN I960
(Other Basic Assumptions Remaining Unchanged)
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TABLE 7. EFPor oF A 5% VARIATIoN ABouT THE BAsIc AssuzwPToN THAT RENT EQUALS
15.3% or NoN-FARm DISPOSABLE INcom IN 196o.
(Other Basic Assumptions Remaining Unchanged)
(Thousands)
PER CENT OF INCOME GOING TO RENT
14.5% 15.3% (Basic Assumption) 16.0%
Rent Class
Shortage Surplus Shortage Surplus Shortage Surplus
0-10 ...... ..... 1,992 ..... 2,297 ..... 2,596
10-20 ....... ..... 2,176 ..... 2,633 3,078
20-30 ....... ..... 984 ...6 1,340 ..... 1,689
30-40 9...... 893 ..... 3 ..... 566 .....
40-50 ....... 2,244 ..... 2,193 ..... 2,144
50-60 ....... 3,383 .... 3,583 ..... 3,783 .....
60-70 ....... 2,755 .... 2,922 ..... 3,090 .....
70-80 ....... 1,750 ..... 1,974 ..... 2,199 .....
80-90 ....... 898 ..... 1,070 ..... 1,239 .....
90-100 ....... 450 ..... 566 ..... 679 .....
100-120 ....... 483 ..... 619 ..... 761 .....
120-140 .... 364 ..... 472 ..... 576
140-170 ....... 339 ..... 448 ..... 557 .....
170-200 ...... 132 ..... 192 ..... 237 .....
Over 200 ...... 23 ..... 63 ..... 94 .....
TOTAL .... 13,714 5,152 14,832 6,270 15,925 7,363
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CHART 5. EFFECT OF A 1o PER C T VALuATION ABoTrr THE BAsic AssuMPnON THAT IN
1960 HOuSIxG VALUES AND CoNsTRucrioN CosTs Wn.L BE 40 PER CENT
ABovE 1940 LBELS
(Other Basic Assumptions Remaining Unchanged)
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TABLE 8. EFFECT OF A 10% VARIATION ABOUT THE BASIC ASSUMPTION THAT IN 1960
HOUSING VALUES AND CONSTRUCTION COSTS WILL BE 4o% ABOVE 1940 LEVELS.
(Other Basic Assumptions Remaining Unchanged)
(Thousands)
1940 - 1960 ESTIMATED PRICE RisE
RetCas30% 40% (Basic Assumption) 50%
Shortage Surplus Shortage Surplus Shortage Surplus
0-10 ....... 3,125 ..... 2,297 ..... 2,045
10-20 ....... ..... 3,377 ..... 2,633 ..... 1,544
20-30 ....... 1,994 ..... 1,340 833
30-40 ....... 1,123 ..... 730 ..... .....
40-50 ....... 2,880 ..... 2,193 ..... 1,490 .....
50-60 ....... 3,943 ..... 3,583 ..... 3,224 .....
60-70 ....... 3,183 ..... 2,922 ..... 2,725 .....
70-80 ....... 2,121 ..... 1,974 ..... 1,761 .....
80-90 ....... 1,221 ..... 1,070 ..... 992 .....
90-100 ....... 563 ..... 566 ..... 448 .....
100-120 ....... 697 ..... 619 ..... 550 .....
120-140 ....... 508 ..... 472 ..... 431 .....
140-170 ....... 507 ..... 448 ..... 399 .....
170 -200...... 224 ..... 192 ..... 179
Over 200 ....... 88 ..... 63 ..... 5
TOTAL ..... 17,058 8,496 14,832 6,270 12,984 4,422
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CHART 6. ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF OCCUPIED NON-FARM DWELLING
UNITS UNDER ASSUMPTIONS. "A'--BASc ASSUMPTIONS OF THIS STUDY-
AND "B"--AvERAGE FAMILY INCOME 20 PER CENT BELOW 1945
(Price level 40 per cent above 1940)
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TABLE 9. ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF OCCUPIED NOfr-FARM DWELLING UNITS
UNDER ASSUMPTIONS "A"--BAIC ASSUMPTIONS OF THIS STUDY-AND "B"-AvEAoE
FAMILY INCOME 20% BELOW 1945.
(Price Level 4o% Above 1940)
Rent Class Assumption A Assumption B
$ Per Month 'Per cent Per cent
0-10 4.7 7.6
10-20 9.6 14.1
20-30 13.2 16.1
30 -40 15.3 16.3
40 -50 14.8 14.2
50 -75 26.9 20.7
Over 75 15.5 11.0
100.0 100.0
Average Rent Per Month ..... 50.19 42.60
Median Rent Per Month ...... 44.89 37.65
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CHART 7. PERCENTAGE DIsTIBUTIoN OF OCCUPIED NoN-FAm DWELUNG UNITS FOR
SELECTED PERIODS AT 1940 PRICE LEvEL
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TABLE 10. COMPARISON oF THE PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF OCCUPIED DWELLING UNITS
UNDER ASSUMPTIONS "A" AND "B" wni THE DxSTRIBUTION REPORTED BY
THE CENSUS IN SELECTED YEARS.
(All at 1940 Prices)
CENSUS YEARS ASSUMPTION
Rent Class
1930 1940 1945 B A
$ Per Month Per cent Per cent Per cent Per cent Per cent
0.10 ........... 14.50 15.97 13.85 12.88 8.10
10-20 ........... 20.70 24.23 25.85 21.30 16.10
20-30 ........... 19.00 22.87 27.10 22.95 21.60
30-40 ........... 13.95 16.29 17.95 18.66 20.00
40-50 ............ 10.20 9.24 6.85 11.27 15.20
50-75 ........... 12.19 7.97 4.60 9.52 12.50
Over 75 .......... 9.46 3.43 3.80 3.42 6.50
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
assumed a decline of about 2o per cent in the money income of familks below the
1945 levels. For the purposes of this study we used this as the basis foi the second
set of calculations on the probable housing market, but kept the other assumptions
constant. Chart 6 (and accompanying Table 9) compares the possible market on the
basis of the assumption used by Mr. Wyatt and the basic assumption used in this
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study, including the effect of these two assumptions on median rents, and on the
distribution of the rents by price classes.
Chart 7 (and iccompanying Table io) compares the distribution of occupied
dwellings according to monthly rent or rental equivalent which prevailed in i93o,
194o, and 1945, according to Census reports, and the distribution which would prevail
in i96o under each of the two assumptions. The 1940 price level has been used as a
common denominator, and each of the other distributions has been adjusted to this
'basis. It will be noted that, compared with the i93o distribution, Assumption A
presumes a decided shift from the lowest rent groups toward the medium rents as
well as a sizable decrease in the percentage paying over 75 dollars a month. Assump-
tion B allows for a small percentage reduction in the lowest rent class only, a small
increase in the houses renting for IO to 30 dollars, and a very considerable reduction
in those costing over 75 dollars a month.
The following table (Table ii) gives the picture in more detail showing the pos-
sible demand for housing by I96O on the basis of the two sets of assumptions. If the
first premise is correct, and income stays up and costs are held down, there will be a
commercially effective demand for nearly 15 million units between now and i96o.
Over half of these will be in the price class of $40 to $70, or in terms of 1940 prices a
$30 to $5o range. If Mr. Wyatt's assumption as to income is correct, with other things
remaining unchanged, there will be an effective commercial demand for about 1i mil-
lion units. Under the assumptions used, each increase or decrease of 5 per cent in the
family income, cost of construction or rent or rental equivalent has the effect of
reducing the potential market by about iooo,ooo units. Consequently, a 20 per cent
cut in income premised by Mr. Wyatt reduces the market very decidedly, as shown
in the preceding table.
TABLE ii. POSSIBLE DEmAND FOR HouSING RY 196o UNDER AssuMPTION "A" AND "B."
(Thousands)
ASSUMPTON A ASsUmmPTo B
Rent Class
Shortage Surplus Shortage Surplus
0-10 ......... ..... 2,297 1,126
10-20 ......... ..... 2,633 804
20-30 .............. ..... 1,340 136
30-40 .............. 131 ..... 138 .....
40-50 .............. 2,193 ..... 1,944 .....
50-75 .............. 7,679 ..... 5,041 .....
Over 75 .............. 4,230 ..... 2,505 .....
TOTALS ........ 14,832 6,270 10,628 2,066
The figure of the potential market of approximately i5,oooooo for the next 15
years on the basis of our first assumption should be contrasted with the expected
increase in the number of families, which is estimated by the Census to be roughly
7,5oo,ooo; that is, if the historical methods of operation in the construction industry
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were to be followed in the next 15 years we would have a commercial market for
about 7,500,000 families.
About half of the 15,000,000 market is independent of the increase in the number
of families. By holding down costs and building to the income distribution there-
fore, fluctuations should be sharply reduced. Even if the marriage rate falls the
rehousing market would still be with us. By developing two markets instead of
relying on one, we would be increasing the volume and the stability of the industry.
'Under the second assumption, which would appear to be the most pessimistic
one we would care to make-a decline of 20 per cent in the national family income-
we would still have a rehousing market of nearly 3 million houses during this
15-year period if the industry will hold down costs and build to the market. This
would be in addition to the demand caused by the increase in the number of fami-
lies. Historically the-industry has not developed any replacement demand but has
assumed that little could be done but build houses to last 8o years or more. So that
even this very conservatively estimated 3 million market would be a net gain of 3
million for the industry.
In the consumer goods industries there is always a market from existing con-
sumers because of the short life of most consumers goods. There is usually in addi-
tion a market caused by an increase in the number of consumers. In durable goods
industries other than housing there is a market caused by replacement of existing
goods as more efficient producer goods are developed, or as existing producer goods
wear out. If the housing industry will build to the market it too can secure some
of this type of business.
The present flash commercial market for housing in some respects makes it easier
to start developing a rehousing market. It will demonstrate to the industry that there
is a mass market for low-priced housing, and it is this low-priced housing in which
it will be easiest to use the new techniques which have been becoming available to
the industry. During the war it was necessary to build a thousand-house develop-
ment at a clip, and there was a considerable advance in construction methods. These
advances have indicated that it is technically and administratively possible to reduce
construction costs as the material and labor supply becomes adequate. For instance,
the belt line process in the factories has been adapted to building of houses. Even
before the war this had been done by some firms who learned to have highly special-
ized workers move past the site in a regular sequence, instead of having the article
being produced moving past the specialized worker, as occurs in most belt line
manufacturing processes carried on under a roof. Other firms reduced costs by
more conventional methods of assembling parts of houses under roofs and then
completing the assembly on the site.
The growth of large building organizations has brought an increase in the man-
agerial abilities of the field and this competition has resulted in increasing the skills
of smaller builders. The pressure for reducing cost is being aided too by new in-
dustrial capacity, developed during the war, which is being utilized in the building
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products field. This means that improved building materials are now in prospect,
which can be used in the low cost mass market. Acceptance on the part of builders
of these newer techniques and managerial abilities for the purpose of building at
competitive prices in the mass market could result in production of houses at a profit
and in a volume large enough to rehouse the next io years from 3 million families
(if Mr. Wyatt's estimates are correct) to 7 million, if the estimates used in this
analysis are correct.
The acceptance of these new methods also would help the industry to cut costs as
general price levels drop and thereby would further stabilize the industry. The re-
housing market could proceed in times of reduced national income because reduction
in handicraft operations at the site would reduce the resistance to lower costs with
the general decline in the wholesale index. And with large firms interested in the
completed house as distinguished from only small parts of a house, there will be in-
creased interest in the reduction of the prices of materials going into the house,
which will cause increased competition for conventional building materials. It
would appear possible therefore for private industry to sharply reduce fluctuations
in the house building field if enough builders decide it is worth the attempt.
There are other aspects of the industry, aside from its flictuations and its failure
to build to the market. Many of these are covered in other articles in this sym-
posium, and need only to be mentioned here. For instance, there has been a decline
in the tendency to build for rent. Newly formed families can rarely afford to buy
housing,:and even if they could, their housing needs at the time the family is formed
are often quite different from what they will be after a few years. The housing
needs of a family with children are quite different from the housing needs of most
families without children. Consequently, there is a need for the continued production
of .rental housing. Industry has this problem, and others to master, if we are not to
have a different type of housing crisis in the futire.
It may appear at first sight that the difference between the estimated commercial
market based on Mr. Wyatt's assumption and the estimated market based on the
assumption that 1945 incomes are maintained, is so great as to give the industry a
strong feeling of uncertainty as to what the market really is. If we assume a
5oo,ooo market for the expansion of population over the long run, and if there is
demand for about 200,000 for the rehousing market (under Mr. Wyatt's premise),
we have a total demand for approximately 700,000 'a year. If we have a demand
for 500,000 for rehousing purposes (under the other premise) there is a total com-
mercial demand of a million new houses a year. The difference between 700,000
and a million is nearly 50 per cent. But this is not the dilemma it appears. In the
first place, under almost any assumption, there is a current market today for about
a million houses a year. Should national income drop and unemployment increase
to serious proportions, andc'hould the country resign itself to this situation, the con-
struction industry could read' the signs as well as the rest of us and adapt itself to
a 700,000'annual market. Should the national income tend to stay up, the con-
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utruction industry could adapt itself to a million house market. In general, a varia-
tion of 5 per cent in the national income, proportionate income going to rent, or in
the cost of housing, will affect total demand by about 7 per cent and rehousing de-
mand by about 15 per cent. Industry therefore can watch these figures and can
forecast demand within these limits with considerable confidence.
The technique outlined in this study can be used with adjustments, such as allow-
ances for migration, for small market areas, etc. In fact, it cannot be used other-
wise. An increase in income which is concentrated in the Far West, for instance,
would add little to the market for housing in the Northeast. It might even reduce
the demand for housing in the Northeast. Other things being equal, the demand for
rehousing will be increased only as the incomes available for housing in a particular
area are affected.
If the industry insists in remaining in the handicraft era, we shall continue to
have a boom-and-bust psychology, a boom-and-bust industry, and increased govern-
ment intervention. We cannot remain half employed and half unemployed. If
other industries learn to stabilize, or at least to reduce fluctuations, the construction
industry will have to learn it too, or accept controls. Examination of the industry
and of the environment in which it operates, and acquaintanceship with leaders in
the field, leaves me with the conclusion that the industry can change its old habits.
Ten years from now a symposium on the subject should not have to include a dis-
cussion of the housing crisis in a free economy. Or at least if such a subject is in-
cluded, the term "crisis" should not bear the connotation it does today. The prob-
lem is basically less a problem for economists and government officials than a problem
for labor and for businessmen. We believe they can solve it. It is hoped that "govern-
ment" does not have to.

